DPRK Statement on Six-Party Talks
The following statement was published by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on August 14.
A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the DPRK on August 13 issued the following statement clarifying the DPRK's stand on the six-party talks:
Some disturbing views and assertions intended to becloud the prospect of solving the nuclear issue are heard from inside and outside the U.S. administration with the six-party talks at hand.
The U.S. is making an unreasonable unilateral assertion that the DPRK must dismantle its nuclear deterrent force before dialogue if it wants to get more aid from the international community, talking about the "written security assurances", the idea set out by Congress, or "collective security assurances" to be given by the U.S. together with countries around Korea, instead of responding to the proposal to conclude a non-aggression treaty with the DPRK.
There is also a rumor that Washington intends to form an inspection team involving five countries expected to attend the six-party talks and carry out an "earlier inspection" of the DPRK so as to verify Pyongyang's will to scrap its nuclear program before dialogue.
If this is the true U.S. approach towards the talks, one may come to the conclusion that at the coming talks the U.S. will seek a sinister aim of forcing the DPRK to scrap its "nuclear program" in a bid to completely disarm it in return for giving it "security assurances" with a paper without any binding force.
This approach suggests that it would be hard to expect any substantial results from the talks.
Clear is the stand of the DPRK on the talks.
Firstly, it wants to confirm the U.S. willingness to make a switchover in its Korea policy.
A master key to the solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. is for the latter to make a fundamental switchover in its hostile policy toward the former.
The nuclear issue surfaced and deteriorated as the present U.S. administration listed the DPRK as part of "an axis of evil" and the target of preemptive nuclear attack and ditched the DPRK-U.S. Agreed Framework.
Therefore, the U.S. switchover in its hostile policy towards the DPRK comes as a precondition for the solution to the nuclear issue.
It will be considered that the U.S. has practically given up its hostile policy toward the DPRK when a non-aggression treaty with legal binding is concluded and diplomatic relations are established between the DPRK and the U.S. and it is made clear that the U.S. does not obstruct economic cooperation between the DPRK and other countries.
At the Beijing talks in April the U.S. tried to play a trick, not seeking to make a policy switchover. At the upcoming six-way talks the U.S. will have to give an answer as regards the dramatic proposal made by the DPRK at the Beijing talks for the settlement of the nuclear issue between the two countries.
By the answer the DPRK will judge whether the U.S. is willing to make a policy switchover or it will continue to play a trick.
If it is confirmed that the six-way talks are nothing but another pitfall for disarming the DPRK in spite of its utmost magnanimity, the DPRK will be left with no other option.
It is clear that as long as the U.S. insists on its hostile policy toward the DPRK, the latter will not abandon its nuclear deterrent force.
Secondly, the DPRK does not demand of the U.S. a "guarantee for security or for system" as a present, but wants to conclude a non-aggression treaty that would strictly and legally guarantee that neither of the two sides attacks the other. The DPRK does not ask anyone to provide a guarantee for the security of its system. Its system is the socialist system of Korean style chosen by its people. It is not a matter that needs a guarantee by a third party. It is an insult to the DPRK to talk about "security" of its system guaranteed by a third party. Its system is guaranteed and safeguarded by its people themselves.
The proposal made by the DPRK for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the DPRK and the U.S. is aimed at preventing a war on the Korean Peninsula and guaranteeing the security and prosperity of all the Korean people. It is not a call for a collective "guarantee for the system and for security" by the participants in the multilateral talks at all.
Only the U.S. is threatening the DPRK. The very source of the danger of war on the Korean Peninsula is the hostile relations between the DPRK and the U.S. and, to put it more concretely, the U.S. hostile policy toward the DPRK.
The surrounding countries, except the United States, unanimously oppose a war and, in this sense, have established good neighborly and friendly relations or are committed to non-aggression with the DPRK. Therefore, the conception of "guarantee of collective security" is meaningless and there will be no need of it for us in the future either.
The doctrine of "expression of the will to give up the nuclear program in exchange for security guarantee" is meant, in the final analysis, not to solve the nuclear issue by simultaneous action and it is nothing but a dishonest jugglery to legalize international pressure for disarming the DPRK by branding it as "an offender of law."
The DPRK and the U.S. stands in extreme hostile relations. So, the U.S. steps of policy switchover and the steps for the solution of the nuclear issue must be taken strictly on the principle of simultaneous action by both sides.
It is our immovable judgment that shunning a solution of the problem by simultaneous action and persisting in the DPRK acting first are, in essence, intended to disarm it and swallow it up.
A solution of the problem can be sincerely discussed only by the method of "give-and-take" talks.
Thirdly, an "earlier inspection" is impossible and unthinkable before the U.S. abandons its hostile policy against the DPRK.
The call for an "earlier inspection" of the nuclear facilities of the DPRK is an outrageous interference in the DPRK's internal affairs and infringement upon its sovereignty.
By abusing the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.S. has so far used verification by inspection as a lever for stifling our system and is still trying to completely disarm the DPRK under the pretext of verification.
That is why we deal with inspection with utmost alertness.
The matter of verification through inspection can be discussed only after it is confirmed that the U.S. has abandoned its hostile policy and renounced nuclear threats against the DPRK.
It is a mistake if the U.S. attempts to force an "earlier inspection" upon the DPRK, putting it on a par with Iraq.
The U.S. should approach the talks, clearly seeing that its policy switchover toward the DPRK is the key to the solution of the problem.